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Case No. 900288-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Section 77-35-26 and 78-2a-3(f) Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, and for the reason that this is an appeal 
from District Court conviction of the defendant of one felony of 
the third degree, and one felony of the second degree. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANTS BY MEANS OF A 
ROADBLOCK VIOLATED THE DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS 
AGAINST WARRANTLESS AND UNREASONABLE SEARCHES 
AND SEIZURES AS DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 1, SEC-
TION 14, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
2 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED IS THE RESULT OF INTER-
ROGATIONS WHICH OCCURRED IN VIOLATION OF THE 
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IS INADMIS-
SIBLE. 
POINT III 
THE MILLARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTY LACKED 
PROBABLE CAUSE, EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, OF 
CONSENT TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK OF 
THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE, AND THUS EVIDENCE 
SEIZED THEREFROM SHOULD BE DETERMINED AS 
INADMISSIBLE. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings 
The defendant was charged by criminal information with the 
felony charges relating to Illegal Possession Of Controlled 
Substances. Defendant filed a Motion To Suppress the evidence 
seized from the car he was operating. That motion was denied. A 
Jury Trial was had, wherein the defendant was found guilty, and 
judgment and sentence thereafter pronounced. The conviction and 
sentence are now appealed, with the appeal directed to the question 
of the admissibility of the evidence seized from defendant's 
automobile. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 29, 1988, the defendant was traveling from Nevada 
to Idaho, andf in part, was using the Interstate 15 highway. The 
Millard County Sheriff had determined, on his own discretion, to 
establish a roadblock on this major interstate highway for the 
purposes of checking drivers licenses, vehicle registration, and 
safety, and any other undefined criminal activity, but it was 
admitted that there was no particular problem with such matters on 
that highway. (T. 108, 109, 151, 169) 
A published notice in the local paper, the Millard County 
Chronicle Progress, as to such roadblock and its purposes was made 
one time in the legal notice section; with the notice being one 
column in width and one-half to one inch in height. (See Addendum) 
The defendant did not see the published notice, nor would the 
majority of persons traveling upon the subject roadway. 
The roadblock had been established in a location selected by 
the sheriff's office, and was located just south of Fillmore, Utah, 
on a straight and flat section of 1-15. (T. 153) There was some 
prior warning. However, the defendant, Shoulderblade, who was 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 4 
driving his vehicle at the time of the stop was able to safely 
negotiate the entry into the roadblock. 
The investigating officer, Jeff Whatcott, courteously 
approached the defendants, determined that the defendants were 
properly driving the vehicle, (T. Ill, 151, 171), determined that 
the vehicle was in safe operating condition, was properly register-
ed, and that both defendants had valid driver's licenses, that the 
vehicle was not stolen, and that there were no outstanding warrants 
for either of the defendants. In addition, he determined that 
there was no detectible signs of any law violations and no probable 
cause to suspect violations. (T. 171) 
Under these circumstances, the officer, who had complete 
discretion as to how to proceed, having had no direct instructions 
as to procedures for this roadblock and having only been instructed 
regarding body language and methods of interrogation of suspected 
law violators, then proceeded to conduct an in-custody interroga-
tion of the defendants. (T. 151, 168) There was no miranda 
warning given, (T. 112, 113, 114) nor was the reason for the 
custodial roadblock stop given, (T. 112, 113 114) nor was there any 
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explanation as to the reason for the continued custodial interroga-
tion. (T. 114) 
The defendants were than asked if they were transporting 
drugsf alcohol, or firearms, to which a negative response was 
given. (T. 114) 
The investigating officer then asked, "May I look?" To which 
question, the officer says the defendant, Small, replied, "Yeah, 
go ahead." No response from the defendant, Shoulderblade. (T. 
114) 
The search was conducted and suspected contraband drugs were 
found. 
Finally, the State acknowledged that the plaintiff, State of 
Utah, operates Ports of Entry upon the roadways leading into the 
State and that the defendants would have passed through such a Port 
of Entry coming into the State on 1-15 from Nevada. (See Addendum) 
The court is asked to take judicial notice of the fact that the 
State of Utah operates ten Ports of Entry, located on all major 
roadways leading into and out of the State of Utah, and that such 
Ports of Entry locations are properly marked on the attached 
official Utah Road Map. 
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On the date of this roadblock, Officer Whatcott stopped and 
checked approximately 20 vehicles; that almost all persons in these 
vehicles were apprehensive and frightened at being so stopped and 
interrogated. 
POINT I 
THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANTS BY MEANS OF A 
ROADBLOCK VIOLATED THE DEFENDANTS1 RIGHTS 
AGAINST WARRANTLESS AND UNREASONABLE SEARCHES 
AND SEIZURES AS DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 1, SEC-
TION 14, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, 
Article 1, Section 14, of the Constitution of 
Utah provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shal] not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Although the wording of this provision is the same as the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the state 
courts do have the option of giving broader protection than are 
required by federal constitutional standards. State v. Brooks, 
638, P.2d, 537, (UT., 1981). At least two justices of the Utah 
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Supreme Court have indicated that in the area of vehicle stops, the 
Utah State Constitution merits a different interpretation than the 
federal courts have given the Fourth Amendment. Those two justices 
have indicated that the federal interpretations are extremely 
confusing. They also feel that the federal standard provides very 
little protection for the individual. 
Courts in other states have recognized a similar lack of 
protection in the federal standard. Those courts have found that 
their respective state constitutional provisions provided a broader 
protection than guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. In State v. 
Smith, 674, P.2d, 562, (OK., Crim., 1984), the defendant had been 
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. He had been 
stopped at a roadblock which officers testified was maintained 
solely to check for driver's license and registration violations. 
However, the circumstances and application of the roadblock 
indicated that it was operated to detect drunk drivers. In 
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that three issues must 
See concurring opinions of Justices Durham and Zimmerman in 
State v. Rice, 717, P.2d, 695, (Ut. 1986) and State v. Dorsey, 731, 
P.2d, 1085, (Ut. 1986). 
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be addressed (1) The type of checkpoint involved; (2) The purpose 
of the roadblock; and (3) The degree of intrusion to motorists* 
The court found that a roadblock, although located at a fixed or 
stationary position, is not permanent. The obvious purpose for the 
roadblock was found to be to detect criminal violations. Finally, 
with respect to the degree of intrusion, the court emphasized the 
subjective aspect, the fear caused to those people stopped by this 
exercise of government authority. The court held that such a 
roadblock violated the state constitution. In doing so, the court 
noted that the goal sought to be achieved by the roadblock, the 
detection of the crime, is commendable, but the roadblock procedure 
ignores the presumption of innocence. In this regard, the court 
stated: 
The court finds such activities by law enfor-
cement authorities, while commendable in their 
ultimate goal of removing DUI offenders from 
the public highways, draw dangerously close to 
what may be referred to as a police state. 
Here, the state agencies have ignored the 
presumption of innocence, assuming the crimin-
al conduct must be occurring on the roads and 
highways, and have taken an "end justifies the 
means" approach. The court is not so naive to 
think that criminal conduct does not occur 
regularly in the form of DUI offenders. Yet, 
a basis tenet of American jurisprudence is 
that the government cannot assume criminal 
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conduct in effectuating a stop such as the one 
presented herein. Were the authorities al-
lowed to maintain such activities as presented 
in this case, the next logical step would be 
to allow similar stops for searching out other 
types of criminal offenders. 
State v. Smith, supra, at 564. The final point that the court 
made in reaching this conclusion is that the officers had no 
statutory authority to conduct the roadblock. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon addressed this issue in the 
context of a civil suit for damages by a plaintiff who was stopped 
at a roadblock in Nelson v. Lane County, 304, OR., 97, 743, P.2d, 
692, (OR., 1987). Two other criminal cases involving similar 
roadblocks were addressed by the court at that time: State v. 
Boyanovsky, 304, OR., 131, 743, P.2d, 711, (OR., 1987), and State 
v. Anderson, 304, OR., 139, 743, P.2d, 715, (OR., 1987). In Nelson 
v. Lane County, supra, the state sought to uphold the use of a 
roadblock on the basis that such a seizure was constitutionally 
authorized, in the alternative, the state argued that a roadblock 
constituted an administrative search. 
In Nelson, the state maintained that it had statutory 
authority to conduct a roadblock under a general statute that gave 
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law enforcement agencies the authority to enforce the criminal 
laws. The state claimed that the statute implicitly authorized 
roadblocks and that the roadblock in question was conducted in 
accordance with "The Oregon State Police Patrol Manual." The court 
rejected this argument. In doing so, the court reasoned: 
By and large, agencies of the executive branch 
are free to carry out their assigned respon-
sibilities in ways of their own choos]ng. 
Making explicit the manner in which any agency 
is to accomplish its task falls to the agency 
head or that official's designee to instruct 
or subdelegate to subordinate officials. 
However, some procedures may invade the per-
sonal freedoms protected from government 
interference by the constitution. Roadblocks 
are seizures of the person, possibly tc be 
followed by a search of the person or the 
person's effects. For this reason, the autho-
rity to conduct roadblocks cannot be implied. 
Before they search or seize, executive agen-
cies must have explicit authority from outside 
the executive branch. 
Nelson v. Lane County, supra, at 695. The court went on to 
note that the proper procedure for receiving an authorization to 
invade such personal freedoms is to obtain a warrant signed by a 
judge. 
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The court also rejected the state's contention that the 
roadblock qualified as an administrative search. The state argued 
that in an administrative search there was no need for individual-
ized suspicion. The court rejected this argument noting that a 
search is not administrative in nature if its purpose was to detect 
criminal violations. An administrative search is to detect 
noncompliance with the standards that an inspection is intended to 
uphold, not find criminal violations. The court also found that 
there was no legislation that would authorize the conducting of 
administrative roadblocks and thus qualify a roadblock as an 
administrative search. 
The plaintiff in Nelson v. Lane County, supra, also made a 
separate civil claim under the Fourth Amendment to the United State 
Constitution. The court found that under a Fourth Amendment 
2 
analysis a balancing test was required. The court found that the 
roadblock in Nelson was conducted in such a manner as to limit the 
The court criticized the balancing test analysis. The court 
felt that a balancing test failed to adequately assess the role 
that the evidence in an individual case must play as it relates to 
establishing a rule of law which addresses and controls governmen-
tal activity. 
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discretion of the individual officers. The roadblock was ad-
ministered by a supervising officer who had instructed the other 
officers on the procedures to be employed. All drivers were 
stopped at the roadblock. The drivers were told the purposes of 
the roadblock. If there was an indication of intoxication, field 
sobriety tests were administered. Under these circumstances, the 
Oregon court found that the particular roadblock did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
On the same date that Nelson v, Lane County, supra, was 
decided, the Supreme Court of Oregon also addressed the con-
stitutionality of roadblocks in the context of criminal convic-
tions. The court held that under the Oregon State Constitution 
such roadblocks were improper. The Oregon Constitution required 
that officers have individualized suspicion of wrongdoing before 
a person may be stopped. State v. Boyanovsky, supra, State v. 
Anderson, supra. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho reached the same conclusion in 
State v. Henderson, 114, ID., 293, 756, P.2d, 1057r (ID., 1988). 
The defendant had been convicted of driving under the influence 
after being stopped at a roadblock. In analyzing the Idaho 
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tive joint subcommittee indicated that probable cause should be a 
prerequisite to stop a motor vehicle and that the use of roadblocks 
should be discouraged. The only statutory authority for a 
roadblock in Idaho involved situations where officers had a 
reasonable belief that there was a person to be apprehended who had 
violated the law. The final reason that the court gave for its 
holding in Henderson was that individualized suspicion was required 
before a person may be "seized" within the meaning of the Idaho 
Constitution. In reaching this conclusion the court relief 
heavily on the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. 
Boyanovsky, supra, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in 
State v. Smithf supra. 
In addition to the lack of specific statutory authority for 
a roadblock, the court also found that there was no specific 
authority to allow a judge to issue a warrant which would authorize 
the police to conduct a roadblock. The court concluded its opinion 
stating: 
The Idaho legislature has not provided police 
with statutory authority to establish roadblo-
cks , nor has the legislature promulgated rules 
of procedures under which a magistrate or 
district judge can issue a warrant to authori-
ze the police to conduct a roadblock designed 
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A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable suspici-
on to believe he has committed or is in the 
act of committing or is attempting to commit 
a public offense and may demand his rame, 
address, and an explanation of his actions. 
Likewise, in State v. Constantino, 732, P.2d, 125, (UT., 
1987), the State Supreme Court implied that to stop a vehicle, 
officers must at minimum have an articulable suspicion that an 
offense has been committed as described in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-7-15, (1953, as amended). 
The roadblock in this case is improper under Article I, 
Section 14, of the Constitution of Utah. The roadblock Eails to 
meet the requirement of individualized suspicion as required by the 
state legislature. Consequently, the evidence that was seized as 
a result of the roadblock stop in this case must be ordered to be 
suppressed. 
In State v. Deskins, 234, KS., 529, 673, P.2d, 1174, (KS., 
1983) , the defendant had been arrested at a roadblock for drunk 
driving. The Supreme Court of Kansas analyzed the case law and 
found that the Fourth Amendment requires that a balancing test be 
applied to determine if a roadblock would qualify as an exception 
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State v, Deskins, supra, at 1185. 
In this case, there was unbridled discretion left to the 
officer. Officer Whatcott testified that once a vehicle was 
stopped, it was up to the individual officer to decide what to do. 
The only directions that were given to the officer were that they 
were to look for license and registration violationsf liquor 
violations, drug violations and any other type of criminal 
violations. Officer Whatcott testified that once a vehicle was 
stopped and a license and registration were produced, he had the 
discretion to let the vehicle go on its way or to further question 
the occupants. Upon completion of the questioning he then had 
complete discretion to determine if further investigation was 
necessary or if the motorist would be allowed to continue on his 
way. He also testified that the nature of the investigation was 
within his discretion. He could search the vehicle or person, or 
call the dispatcher to check for arrest warrants or stolen vehicle 
reports. 
The location of the roadblock was on Interstate 15. This is 
the major thoroughfare between Southern California, Salt Lake City, 
and points in Colorado, such as Denver. The roadblock was 
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speed, the location of the signs gave motorists less than thirty 
seconds notice if they were traveling at the posted speed limit. 
With respect to safety conditions, evidence indicated that not 
all vehicles were stopped, but semi-tractors with trailers, as well 
as passenger buses, were waived through. The degree of fear and 
anxiety generated by this roadblock was substantial. Travelers on 
the interstate freeway were subjected to a roadblock with little 
or no notice. Officer Whatcott indicated that, in addition to 
requesting the motorist's license and registration, he would ask 
if they were in possession of any weapons, contraband, or alcohol. 
Such a question would be very disconcerting to the average 
motorist. There was no indication that the purpose of the 
roadblock was explained to those people who were stopped. The 
physical inconvenience of being stopped on the freeway was great, 
the fear and anxiety created from the stop and the nature of the 
questioning in this setting were extreme. 
This roadblock did not meet the objective standards required 
by the Fourth Amendment. The stop of the defendant's vehicle was 
unreasonable. The fruits of the search of that vehicle were seized 
in violation of his right to be free from warrantless and un-
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reasonable searches and seizures as described in the Fourth 
Amendment, and the Utah Appellate Courts have so found in the cases 
of State v, Sims, 156, Utah Adv. Rep., 8, (Ut., Ct. , App., 1991); 
State v. Kitchen, No. 900307-CA, (Ut., Ct., App., March 28, 1991); 
and State v. Arroyo, 796, P.2d, 684, (UT., 1990). Those fruits 
must be ordered to be suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED IS THE RESULT OF INTER-
ROGATIONS WHICH OCCURRED IN VIOLATION OF THE 
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IS INADMIS-
SIBLE. 
The applicable constitutional provisions involved in this 
portion of the argument come from the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution; which provides, in part: "No person shall... 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self..."; the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
which provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense."; and the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12; 
which provides, in part: "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 22 
counsel... The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself..." 
Interpretation of these provisions has been much more 
extensive under the federal constitution. However, pertinent state 
rulings will be given consideration. We start with two basic 
federal rulings: 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 12, L.ed, 977; which is summarized, in 
part, as follows: 
...The Supreme Court in its ruling, held that 
where a criminal investigation is no longer a 
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has 
begun to focus on a particular suspect, in 
circumstances where the suspect has been taken 
into police custody, the police carry out a 
process of interrogation that lends itself to 
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspe-
ct has requested and been denied an oppor-
tunity to consult with his lawyer, and the 
police have not effectively warned him of his 
absolute constitutional right to remain sile-
nt, the accused has been denied "the Assis-
tance of Counsel" required by the Sixth Amend-
ment, as made obligatory upon the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that no state-
ment elicited the police during the interroga-
tion may be used against him at a criminal 
trial. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 16, L.ed, 2d, 694; which is summarized, 
in part, as follows: 
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...The court held thatf as an absolute con-
stitutional prerequisite to the admissibility 
of a confession or other incrimatory state-
ment, the suspect must, in the absence of a 
clear, intelligent waiver of the constitution-
al rights involved, be warned prior to ques-
tioning that he has a right to remain silent; 
that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him; and that he has a right 
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
cannot afford an attorney, one will be ap-
pointed for him prior to any questioning, if 
he so desires. Each of the specified four 
warnings must, it was held, be given, it not 
being sufficient to give only some of them. 
The pertinent question now is, when does the right arise? 
This questions centers on the interpretation of the term of 
"custody." Custody has been the subject of several reviews 
regarding traffic stops. We feel the best representative case at 
this point is Berkemer v. McCarty, 82, L.ed, 2d, 317, where the 
applicability of the miranda ruling was applied to traffic stops. 
The court said: 
...If a motorist who has been detained pur-
suant to a traffic stop thereafter is sub-
jected to treatment that renders him "in 
custody" for practical purposes the will be 
entitled to the full panoply of protection 
prescribed by miranda. 
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See also the annotation in 25, ALR, 3d, 1977, dealing with the 
subject: Right of motorist stopped by police officers for traffic 
offense to be informed at that time of his federal constitutional 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, The following is an applicable 
quote from the annotation: 
However, two police officers, who, after 
stopping the driver of a car for failirg to 
stop for a red light, questioned the driver as 
to whether he had an operator's license or 
registration, whether he owned the car, who 
did own the car, where the owner lived, wheth-
er the driver owned the contents of the car, 
and what certain items found in the car were 
(dexedrine capsules and marijuana) , were held 
to have subjected the driver to "custodial 
interrogation" requiring miranda warnings, in 
People v, Ceccone, (1968), Cal., App., 2d, 
886,67, Cal., Rptr., 499, reversing a coivic-
tion for possession of marijuana. The court 
found that the defendant driver's inability to 
produce either an operator's license or a 
vehicle registration, his conflicting state-
ments as to the ownership of the car, and his 
inability to describe with more certainty the 
identity or whereabouts of his recent com-
panions, from whom he claimed to have borrowed 
the car, were sufficient to give the officers 
probable cause to believe that the car had 
been stolen. The court also found that the 
officer's observations gave them reasonable 
cause to believe that the defendant was guilty 
of illegal possession of narcotics, so that 
the officers had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant before they asked him about the 
contents of the car. Once the investigating 
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officer has probable cause to believe that the 
person being detained for questioning has 
committed an offense, the court said, the 
officer cannot be expected to permit the 
suspect to leave; at that point, at the lates-
t, the interrogation becomes custodial, and 
before any further questioning, the suspect 
must be warned of his rights. Moreover, the 
court found that the prior questioning could 
have led the defendant driver, as a reasonable 
person, to believe, at the time of his ques-
tioning concerning the contents of the car, 
that he was not free to depart. Miranda, the 
court said, permits no questioning without a 
prior warning once the suspect is in custody, 
that is, if, as a reasonable person, he is led 
to believe that he is physically deprived of 
his freedom of action in any significant way. 
We will now give consideration to the matter in which this law 
has been applied by our Utah Supreme Court. The first case 
referred to is the case of Salt Lake City v. Karner. Here the 
court specifically considered applicability of the miranda warning 
in an arrest situation where the defendant was suspected of driving 
under the influence of intoxicants. In the Karner case, the court 
held that the miranda warning was not a necessary prerequisite for 
the request of taking a field sobriety test and that such temporary 
detention was not custodial. The court did state, however, as 
follows: 
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...An accused must be apprised of his miranda 
rights if the setting is custodial or ac-
cusatory rather than investigatory. In other 
words, at the point the environment becomes 
custodial or accusatory, a police officerfs 
questions must be prefaced with a miranda 
warning. However, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether a crime has been committed, 
investigation, and interview are critical; 
under such circumstances, the warning is not 
required. 
Here the court puts the threshold point for giving the miranda 
warning where the setting is custodial. And there is no doubt the 
defendants were in the officer's custody, especially following the 
determination that they met all safety, driver's license, and 
registration requirements, and the officer determined to inter-
rogate the defendants, based upon the officer's undefined suspicio-
n, the setting was custodial and accusatory, and not just inves-
tigatory. 
POINT III 
THE MILLARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTY LACKED 
PROBABLE CAUSE, EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES OR 
CONSENT, TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK OF 
THE DEFENDANT'S VEHLCLE. 
The officer conducted a search of the defendant's vehicle, 
admittedly, without any indication of possible law violations. 
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The officers, in continuing the search, were presumably 
relying on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment. The automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment was first recognized in Carroll 
v. United States, 267, U.S., 132, (1925). In that case, the 
defendants were convinced of illegal transportation of intoxicating 
liquor. The conviction arose out of an incident where the defen-
dants were stopped by federal and state agents while driving their 
vehicle on a highway from Detroit to Grand Rapids, Michigan. This 
was on a road that was known to be used extensively by bootleggers 
bringing illegal liquor into the county. About eight weeks before 
the stop, the defendants agreed to illegally sell liquor to the 
same agents in Grand Rapids, Michigan. That deal was never 
consummated. At the time of the agreement, the defendants were 
driving the same automobile in which they were arrested. The 
agents had also seen the defendants in the same automobile on the 
same road several weeks earlier. When they attempted to follow, 
the defendants evaded them. The issue raised in the Supreme Court 
was whether the defendants1 automobile could be stopped and 
searched without a warrant as required by the Fourth Amendment. 
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The stop was made pursuant to a statute in the National Prohibition 
Act. It gave federal agents authority to seize liquor being 
transported without a warrant. The court analyzed the previous 
case law and federal statutes and came to the following con-
clusions: First, the case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment at 
that time never dealt with the question of objects in transport, 
5 
but only with the search of homes and offices. Second, a number 
of federal statutes distinguished between searches of homes or 
offices and searches of vehicles in transport. The statutes all 
mandated warrants for searches of buildings, but required warrants 
only when practicable for vehicles in transport. The court noted 
that the obvious legislative policy in such statutes was that a 
vehicle can quickly be moved out of the jurisdiction before a 
warrant could be served, thus putting the contraband beyond the 
authority of the warrant. 
Because of the ease in movement, the court held that warrant-
less stops of vehicles, if subject to specific limitations, did not 
Weeks v. United States, 232, U.S., 383, (1914; Silverthorn 
Lumber Co., v. United States, 251, U.S., 385, (1961); Gouled v. 
United States, 255, U.S., 298, (1921); Amos v. United States, 255, 
U.S., 313, (1921) . 
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violate the Fourth Amendment. The limitations noted by the court 
were: First, it would be intolerable and unreasonable to allow the 
authorities to stop any and every vehicle on the highway and search 
it. Consequently, the court held that for an officer to lawfully 
stop a vehicle in transit, he must have probable cause to believe 
that the vehicle is transporting contraband. Second, the court 
held, "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably 
practical, it must be used." 267, U.S., at 156. 
The Supreme Court has allowed officers to search an entire 
vehicle without a warrant when there was probable cause to believe 
there was contraband in the vehicle. Husty v. United States, 282, 
U.S., 694, (1930); Sher v. United States, 305, U.S., 251, (1938), 
(Confidential informant indicated that a particular vehicle 
contained contraband); Chambers v. Maroney, 399, U.S., 42, Rehden, 
400, U.S., 856, (1979), (Vehicle used in an armed robbery); 
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417, U.S., 583, (1974), (Caretaking function of 
vehicle inventory required a search of the entire vehicle). 
In United States v. Ross, 456, U.S., 793, (1982), the court 
upheld the search of a bag and a pouch found in the trunk of the 
defendant's automobile. The police received information that the 
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defendant was selling narcotics out of the trunk oE that car. The 
defendant's physical description, a description of his automobile, 
his alias, and a description of the neighborhood wliere he could be 
found were given to the police. The car was stopped. Narcotics 
and currency were located in the containers in the trunk of the 
car. After discussing the rationale behind the automobile 
exception to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment, the court 
stated: 
Moreover, the probable cause determination 
must be based on objective facts that could 
justify the issuance of a warrant by a magist-
rate and not merely on the subjective good 
faith of the police officers. "[As] we have 
seen, good faith is not enough to constitute 
probable cause. That faith must be grounded 
on facts within knowledge of the [officer], 
which is the judgment of the court would make 
his faith reasonable." H). , at 161-162, 45 S., 
Ct., at 288, (quoting Director General v. 
Kastenbaum, 263, U.S., 25, 28). 
In short, the exception to the warrant re-
quirement established in Carroll the scope 
of which we consider in this case applies 
only to searches of vehicles that are sup-
ported by probable cause. In this class of 
cases, a search is not unreasonable if based 
on facts that would justify the issuance of a 
warrant, even though a warrant has not actual-
ly been obtained. [Footnotes omitted] -
, U.W., , 102, S., Ct., at 2164. 
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However, when law enforcement agents have probable cause to 
believe that a particular container that is located in a vehicle 
contains contraband, then there cannot be a general search of the 
vehicle. Furthermore, a warrant must be obtained to search such 
containers. United States v. Chadwick, 438, U.S., 1, (1977); and 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442, U.S., 753, (1979). 
In Wimberly v. Superior Court, 128, Cal., Rptr., 641, 547, 
P.2d, 417, (1976), the California Supreme Court had a factual 
situation very similar to this case. The defendant was stopped for 
a traffic violation. A pipe and marijuana seeds were located in 
the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Based on that discovery, 
the state claimed probable cause to search the trunk. Several 
pounds of marijuana were located in the trunk. The court held that 
the search of the trunk was improper. One basis for this holding 
was that a person has a greater expectation of privacy in the trunk 
of his vehicle than in the passenger compartment. The court then 
noted that the scope of an automobile search, like any warrantless 
search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances 
surrounding it. 
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With respect to the search of the trunk of the car, the court 
then stated: 
In light of the foregoing principles we can 
only conclude that the existence of probable 
cause to search the interior of a car is not 
necessarily sufficient to justify the search 
of the car's trunk. A search based on probab-
le cause which reasonably only tends to sup-
port the inference that contraband or evidence 
will be found in the passenger compartment 
will be of intolerable intensity and scope if 
expended to include a closed trunk. In such 
a situation there must be some specific ar-
ticulable facts which give reasonable cause to 
believe that seizable items are, in fact, 
concealed in the trunk. 
Wimberly v. Superior Court, supra, at 424. The court then 
found that evidence that there may have been marijuana use in the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle would not give rise to an 
inference that there was more contraband in the trunk. Therefore, 
the search of the trunk was unlawful. 
A. UTAH COURTS HAVE A DUTY TO INTERPRET THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVIS-
ION, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14, INDEPENDENTLY OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Earl, 716, P.2d, 803, (UT., 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression of thirty-
three pounds of marijuana discovered during a routing inventory 
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search of the trunk of a rented car. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Durham made it clear that the court's opinion was based 
solely on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
noting that neither the State nor the defendant had discussed 
relief independently based on Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah 
Constitution, which also contains a protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, ID., at 805. Justice Durham then held: 
...It is imperative that Utah lawyers brief 
this court on relevant state constitutional 
questions. See State v. Hygh, 711, P.2d, 264, 
(UT., 1985), (Zimmerman, J., concurring). We 
cite with approval the summary of scholarly 
commentary and analytical technique set forth 
by the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. 
Jewett, 500, A.2d., 233, (VT., 1985), (State 
v. Earl), 716, P.2d, 803, 806, (UT., 1986). 
This position was first advanced in Utah in Justice Zimmer-
man's concurring opinion in State v. Hygh, supra, wherein he 
observed: 
...I cannot agree with two assumptions im-
plicit in the majority opinion; first, that 
the scope of the warrant requirement under 
Article 1, Section 14, is congruent with that 
developed by the federal courts under the 
Fourth Amendment...The federal law regarding 
warrantless searches and seizures has become 
a labyrinth of rules built upon a series of 
contradictions and distinctions...Sound argu-
ments may be made in favor of positions at 
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variance with the current federal law respect-
ing both the scope of the individuals right to 
be free from warrantless searches and seizures 
and the remedy of any violation of that right 
State v, Hygh, supra, at 271-271, 
Justice Durham jointed with Justice Zimmerman in his concur-
Justice Durham again joined with Justice Zimmerman in his 
concurring opinion in State v. Dorsey, 731, P.2d, 1085, (UT., 
1986), in which he observed, in footnote 1: 
...I do not accept the proposition that in 
interpreting the search and seizure provision 
in the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 
14, we should slavishly follow the ever quick-
ening trend started by the United States 
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 
267, U.S., 132, 45, S., Ct., 280, 69, L.ed, 
543, (1925), of eroding the warrant protection 
that have long been central to American search 
and seizure law, simply because the place to 
be searched is a motor vehicle... For all 
intents and purposes, a Utah's constitutional 
provision has lain dormant since its passage 
in 1896. Its meaning needs to be fleshed out, 
but there is nothing in law or logic to sug-
gest that the form that emerges fron that 
process must be copy of what the United States 
Supreme Court has made of the Fourth Amendment 
in the years since 1896. ID., at 1091. 
Recently, concurring in State v. Johnson, 60, U.A.R., 30, 
(1987), a case in which an inventory search of a motor vehicle was 
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upheld under the federal constitution, Justice Zimmerman, again 
joined by Justice Durham noted: 
...I would specifically note that the defen-
dant has not challenged this search under 
Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah Constitu-
tion. As noted in my separate opinion in 
State v. Hygh, [citation omitted], much of the 
existing federal Fourth Amendment warrantless 
search and seizure law is rather Kaf-
kaesque...Nothing has occurred within the 
almost two years since Hygh to dissuade me 
from this view. And I include within the 
sweep of this condemnation the rules governing 
warrantless automobile searches, such as 
occurred in the present case. The notion that 
anything on wheels can be searched by an of-
ficer, who, after the fact, can offer some 
reasonable justification for having done so 
"essentially guts the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement as it pertains to automobile 
searches. There is little reason to believe 
that effective law enforcement requires this 
sacrifice of the interests protected by the 
warrant requirement" [citation omitted]. Were 
this case argued as state constitutional 
ground, I might well find the search unlawful, 
ID., at 33, (emphasis added). 
One of Utahfs Court of Appeals panels has also acknowledged 
that inconsistencies in federal warrantless automobile search cases 
in State v. Larocco, 742, P.2d, 89, (Ut. , App., 1987), with Justice 
Billings concurring, pages 101-105. 
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As noted above, the Utah case of State v. Earlf supra, cited 
the analytical framework advanced in the Vermont case of State v. 
Jewett, supra. In Jewett, the Vermont Supreme Court noted that: 
This generation of Vermont lawyers has an 
unparalleled opportunity to aid in the for-
mulation of a state constitutional jurisprude-
nce that wi1] protect the rights and liberties 
of our people, however the philosophy of the 
United States Supreme Court may ebb and flow. 
500, A.2d, 233, 235. 
Justice Hays, for a unanimous court, suggested several types 
of arguments: (1) The use of historic materials, which may touch 
upon the legislative history of a provision or social and political 
setting in which it originated; (2) The sibling state approach, 
which involves examining what other states have done with identical 
or similar constitutional clauses; and (3) The textual approach, 
which states that state constitutions should follow the interpreta-
tion of the United State Supreme Court, has no firm basis for 
interpreting Utah's Constitution. See generally, The Utah Supreme 
Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986, Utah Law Review, VoJ . , 
2, pages 319-344. 
It is apparent from these recent Utah Supreme Court cases that 
warrantless automobile searches and seizures would have more 
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stringent requirements if such cases were argued under Utah's 
Constitution, Article I, Section 14. The remainder of this paper 
will focus on case laws from other jurisdictions as a guideline for 
Utah Courts to possibly follow. 
B. COURTS OF MANY STATES HAVE DECLINED TO 
FOLLOW UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
APPROVING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES, HOLDING IN-
STEAD THAT THEIR OWN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAUSES AFFORD GREATER 
PROTECTION TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND REQUIRE A 
WARRANT. 
One of the analytical approaches recommended in State v. 
Jewett, supra, is the examination of what other states have done 
with identical or similar constitutional clauses. Such an 
examination reveals a great number of states have declined to 
follow the United States Supreme Court's reasoning concerning the 
reasonableness of various warrantless searches. The following is 
a brief summary of those decisions: 
A. Rejecting the rule in United States v. Ross, 456, U.S., 
798, (1982) is People v. Ruggles, 702, P.2d, 170, (Cal., 1985). 
Ross held that if police officers have probable cause to search for 
contraband goods in a vehicle stopped upon a highway in a legitima-
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te warrantless stop, they may search any containers therein also 
without a warrant, including the trunk and glove box. 
This decision was based upon the warrant exception cases that 
automobiles are inherently mobile and that there is diminislied 
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle. 
B. In People v. Ruggles, the California Supreme Court 
declined to follow this rule under Article I, Section 13, of its 
constitution, which has virtually identical woiding to Utah's 
Article I, Section 14. The California Court hald that absent 
consent or some exigency in addition to the inherent mobility of 
a car, a warrant was required and the police could simply impound 
the vehicle until one was obtained. The court decided that Article 
I, Section 13, required a "more exacting standard [than the Fourth 
Amendment] for cases arising within this state." Ruggles at 176. 
The same result was reached by New Hampshire in State v. Carmago, 
498, A.2d, 292, (N.H., 1985), (similar constitutional wording: no 
exigency in just the "inherent mobility" of motor vehicles, because 
this car was parked and police could get a warrant), and a similar 
result was reached by Oregon in State v. Kock, 725, P.2d, 1285, 
(OR. , 1986) , (parked car not an exigent circumstance) . 
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C. Rejecting the rule of People v. Belton, 453, U.S., 454, 
(1981) , Belton held that when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search without a warrant, 
the passenger compartment of that automobile, including the 
contents of any containers from within the passenger compartment. 
D. In State v. Hernandez, 410, So., 2d, 1381, (LA., 1982), 
Louisiana, a case in which it was not necessary to distinguish or 
analyze Belton, held: 
...Although the Belton case is distinguishable 
and therefore inapplicable here, it should be 
noted that we do not consider it to be a 
correct rule of police conduct under out state 
constitution. We, of course, give careful 
consideration to the United States Supreme 
Court interpretation of relevant provisions of 
the federal constitution, but we cannot and 
should not allow those decisions to replace 
our independent judgment in construing the 
constitution adopted by the people of Louisia-
na. 410, So., 2d, 1381, at 1385. 
E. In Hernandez, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a trial 
court determination that a warrantless search of a vehicle, after 
its driver was arrested and no longer in it, could not be justified 
as a search incident to arrest warrant exception. Similar results 
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were reached by Oregon in State v. Caraher, 653, P.2d, 942, (OR., 
1982) and in Washington in State v. Ringer, 674, P.2d, 1240, 
(Wash,, 1983), (availability of telephonic search warrant must be 
part of determining the exigency of the circumstances justifying 
warrantless search incident to an arrest understate constitution). 
F. Rejecting the rule of United States v. Robinson, 414, 
U.S., 218, (1983), which is that in the case of a lawful custodial 
arrest of a driver of a motor vehicle for a minor traffic offense, 
a full search of the person and containers found on that person is 
an exception to the warrant requirements, and reasonable. 
G. Perhaps the most criticized United States Supreme Court 
decisions on warrantless searches, the following states have 
rejected Robinson and held that their state constitutions provide 
greater protection and require a warrant: 
Alaska, Zehrung v. State, 569, P.2d, 189, 
(Alaska, 1977) , [holding that governmental 
intrusions into personal privacy must be no 
greater than absolutely necessary under the 
circumstances, and, therefore, warrantless 
search of package not in arrestee's actual 
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possession in unlawful; wording similar to 
Utah's]; California, People v. Brisedine, 531, 
P.2d, 1099, (Cal., 1975) [same as Zehrung v. 
State, supra, California language virtually 
identical with Utahfs]; Colorado, People v. 
Clyne, 544, P.2d, 71, (Colo., 1975) [same 
result as Alaska and California]. 
H. In addition, the following states have adopted a higher 
standard under their state constitutional provisions on search and 
seizure than required by the Fourth Amendment of the federal 
constitution: 
Borrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino 
County, 529, P.2d, 590, (Cal., 1974), [warrant 
required to search bank records] , rejecting 
the rule of United States v. Miller, 425, 
U.S., 435, (1976); State v. Hunt, 450, A.2d, 
952, (N.J., 1982), [rejecting United States v. 
Miller, supra]; Commonwealth v. Upton, 476, 
N.E., 2d, 548, (Mass., 1985); and State v. 
Jackson, 688, P.2d, 136, (Wash., 1984), [both 
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rejecting Illinois v. Gates, 462, U.S., 213, 
(1983)] . 
I. From these cases, and many others, it can be seen that-
state courts have required search warrants under state constitu-
tional provisions similar or identical to Utah's Article I, Section 
14, under circumstances where the Fourth Amendment does not require 
a warrant. The general rationale of these state decisions has been 
that individual rights should suffer only "minimal intrusion" under 
state constitutions, and, therefore, absent consent or truly 
exigent circumstances, search warrants are required. The simple 
"inherent mobility" of a car is not viewed by these states as a 
true exigency. 
C. THE STANDARD THAT THE COURTS IN UTAH 
SHOULD ADOPT IS ONE THAT REQUIRES A WARRANT 
BEFORE ANY NONCONSENTUAL SEARCH OF PROPERTY 
NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A 
SUSPECT AND WHERE TRULY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
DO NOT EXIST. 
In State v. Hygh, supra, the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
Gillis Hygh's conviction for aggravated robbery, ruling that 
nonconsentuaJ search of defendant's vehicle was merely a pretext 
for a warrantless search. 
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In concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman, joined by Justice 
Durham, wrote: 
One way to improve predictability might be to 
sharply limit the seep of exceptions to the 
warrant requirement that often raise questions 
of police overreaching. In their place, 
clear-cut rules could be adopted -- for ex-
ample, a flat requirement that a warrant must 
be obtained before any nonconsentual search of 
property not in the immediate physical control 
of a suspect is conducted. Hygh, supra, at 
272, (emphasis original). 
In a footnote, Justice Zimmerman explained: 
"Immediate physical control" refers to an area 
within which a suspect could reasonably be 
expected to grab a weapon or destroy evidence 
during an encounter with police officers. The 
exception would be limited by its justifica-
tion and would not generally permit warrant-
less searches of car trunks, for example, or 
containers beyond the subject's reach. ID., 
at 272, note 2 (emphasis added). 
Justice Zimmerman concluded that: 
...Warrantless searches would be permitted 
only where they justify their traditional 
justification — to protect the safety of 
officers or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence. See, e.g., Chimal v. California, 
395, U.S., 753, 762-52, (1969). Once the 
threat that the suspect will injure the of-
ficers with concealed weapons or will destroy 
evidence is gone, there is no persuasive 
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reason why the officers cannot take the time 
to secure a warrant. Hygh, supra, at 272. 
The above standard set forth in Hygh is the appropiiate 
standard for Utah under Article I, Section 14. The language and 
concepts in the aforementioned cases are consistent with Justice 
Zimmerman's suggested standard in State v. Hygh, that warrants 
be required for all nonconsentual searches of property not in the 
suspect's immediate physical control (meaning the area from which 
the suspect could reasonably be expected to grab a weapon or 
destroy evidence of the crime for which suspected). Put in another 
way, and in more traditional language, warrantless searches should 
be per se unreasonable, absent some real, factual exigent cir-
cumstances that actually create a danger of officer's safety or the 
real possibility of destruction of evidence. This should give the 
proper meaning to the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 14, 
of the Constitution of Utah because it protects, to the utmost, 
individual rights while not hampering law enforcement efforts: 
...Such a rule would be an improvement over-
present law, both for the individual and for 
the police. The individual would be assured 
that, in most cases, his property would tiot be 
searched or seized unless the reasons for the 
search or seizure have first been presented to 
a neutral magistrate and a warrant issued. At 
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the same time, police officers would not be 
forced to speculate about what may or may not 
be subject to search without a warrant. Hygh, 
supra, at 2 72. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case should be suppressed, and the 
defendant granted a new trial. Although this ruling may seem to 
be disagreeable, to allow admission, in view of the facts, 
constitutes the more serious threat to society. It is admitted 
that drug use, and all the attendant wrongs, including transporta-
tion and distribution, is a major problem for the citizens of Utah, 
as well as all sister states within the Union of the United States 
of America. However, loss of personal freedoms, especially freedom 
of movement, under circumstances found in this case, would 
constitute the more serious problem. 
The entire sequence of this roadblock, starting with who 
caused it to be initiated, the dangerous location, the inadequate 
warning on the roadway, failure to tell people the reason, are all 
offensive when considered with the existing legitimate constitu-
tional rights of citizens and their reasonable assumption of 
responsibility when the State has the recognized means to stop 
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traffic and make legitimate inquire at its Ports of Entry. The 
court must suppress the evidence in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of July, 1991. 
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[Unreasonable searches and seizures.) 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
(Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
vet ion 
I (Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.] 
t |Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
J (Disqualification to hold office.] 
\ |Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] 
) (Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. ICitizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
Mates, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
irns of the United States and of the State wherein 
ihe> reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
•hich shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
iitizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
Jjtf process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
^rbdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
iguinst him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
u*n behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
ufe shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wifef nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, 
1896 
Boa. 14. (Unreaaaitnbte search©* forbidden — 
Issuance of wa r ran t ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized.
 lfl<M, 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may de-
mand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 1980 
